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INTRODUCTION 
The p r e s e n t Government has l a i d 
considerable emphasis on the notion that 
workers can, and indeed should, "price 
themselves i n t o jobs" , an emphasis 
apparently vindicated by the Treasury's 
r ecen t review of empi r i ca l evidence 
concerning the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
employment and wages (HMT, 1985). 
Furthermore, the Government's bel ief in 
the importance of the price of labour as a 
determinant of the level of employment has 
manifested i t s e l f in aspects of policy 
other than mere exhortations for unions to 
moderate wage claims. The proposed 
radical reform, and perhaps abolition, of 
the wages councils which govern the legal 
minimum wage payable in many industries; 
the Budget's i n c r e a s e in income tax 
th resho lds intended to moderate wage 
claims by increasing the proportion of the 
gross wage which is actually "taken home"; 
the Budget's attempt to st imulate the 
employment of the low paid by i t s reform 
of National Insurance c o n t r i b u t i o n s 
(a lbei t at the expense, to a degree, of 
the employment of the higher paid); the 
Government's stance vis-a-vis the unions 
as r e f l e c t e d in l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e i r 
attitudes to negotiations with the public 
sector unions (eg the recent disputes 
involving the miners' and the teachers ' 
unions) and their publicly avowed beliefs 
(aired most recently and controversially 
on Mrs Thatcher's tour of the Far East); 
a l l of these re f l ec t in some degree the 
Government's conviction that the key to 
s t imu la t i ng employment, and thereby 
alleviating unemployment, l ies in lowering 
(or a t l e a s t moderating the r a t e of 
increase in) the cost of labour to firms. 
The Government's c r i t i c s maintain, in 
c o n t r a s t , t h a t the most important 
determinant of employment i s the level of 
effective demand in the economy. Some of 
t h e s e c r i t i c s would concede t h a t 
reductions in wages could play a part in 
increasing employment, whereas others 
would adopt the t r ad i t iona l Keynesian 
stance that reductions in rea l wages (if 
they could be effected at a l l by workers) 
would make matters worse by contracting 
aggregate effective demand, and therefore 
employment. All the c r i t i c s , however, 
take the view that effective demand is 
important and currently deficient . The 
Government denies the re levance of 
deficient demand, but i t i s not always 
clear whether th i s i s intended to be an 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l d e n i a l ( fo r some, 
increasingly popular, economic theories 
dismiss even the possibi l i ty of deficient 
effective demand), or conditional upon, 
for example, the Government's judgement as 
to the current s t a t e of the UK economy 
and/or some target inflation rate. 
In th i s a r t i c l e we attempt to provide a 
non-technical guide to the major economic 
issues involved in t h i s debate, and to 
provide a necessarily selective account of 
the empirical evidence relevant to these 
issues. We begin by examining one major 
aspect of the debate: the response of 
firms' demands for labour to changes in 
the real wage. However, i t would be 
i n v a l i d to move from t h i s a n a l y s i s 
d i rec t ly to macroeconomic policy issues. 
A proper evaluation of the effects of 
g e n e r a l wage m o d e r a t i o n r e q u i r e s 
investigation of i t s likely impact on the 
system as a whole: i t i s not suff icient 
simply to examine the demand for labour in 
i so la t ion . Consequently, the discussion 
of the demand for labour i s followed by an 
expl ic i t ly system-wide analysis of the 
possible effects of general moderation in 
the r a t e of wage i n c r e a s e s . For 
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simplicity of exposition, the remainder of 
the analysis i s conducted in terms of a 
wage cut. 
THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR 
A major aspect of the debate between 
n e o c l a s s i c i s t s / M o n e t a r i s t s and t h e i r 
Keynesian cr i t ics is their different views 
of the factors which influence firms' 
demands for labour. This in turn largely 
derives from their conflicting visions of 
the environment in which firms typically 
operate. The neoclassical vision i s one 
of profit maximising firms, operating in 
product markets in which prices are highly 
f lexible with respect to excess demands. 
In contrast, Keynesians tend to regard the 
typical firm as operating under conditions 
of (perhaps highly) imperfectly f lexible 
pr ices , a t t r ibuted to some degree of 
imperfect competition in product markets. 
At the r i sk of overs impl i f icat ion, we 
develop the implications of a l t e rna t ive 
extreme assumptions concerning the degree 
of price flexibili ty in product markets. 
The neoclassical firm, being one of many 
selling a virtually identical product, has 
no effective control over the price of i t s 
product. At the price dictated to i t by 
the market the firm can s e l l a l l tha t i t 
wishes - the neoclassical firm i s not 
constrained in any way by the availability 
of demand. The cr i t ica l factor i s firms' 
" w i l l i n g n e s s t o s u p p l y " . F i rms 
simultaneously select the level of output 
and the leve ls of inputs which maximise 
p rof i t s . Matters are s i m p l i f i e d by 
considering circumstances in which there 
are only two inputs ,cap i ta l and labour, 
and in which, over the relevant time 
interval, the amount of capital i s fixed. 
The firm then only has immediate control 
over output and the labour input. In a 
prof i t maximising firm an addit ional 
employee will be taken on provided he/she 
adds a t l e a s t as much to revenues as to 
costs, for in those circumstances profits 
( the d i f f e r ence between revenues and 
costs) are at worst unchanged by adding to 
employment . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , and 
equivalently, employment i s increased 
provided the addit ional employee results 
in the production of a t l e a s t as many 
units of output as the wage he/she is paid 
can buy. Employment i s inc reased 
provided the "marginal product of labour" 
exceeds the "real product wage". The 
l a t t e r i s the wage evaluated in terms of 
the producer's output (ie deflated by the 
producer's price) and, in general, t h i s 
will not correspond to workers' real "take 
home pay" or the "consumption wage". In 
what follows we shall be concerned with 
the real wage in the former sense. 
What effect does a reduction in the real 
wage, real ised through a f a l l in the 
nominal wage paid to labour, have in this 
context? Given that firms were ini t ia l ly 
maximising p ro f i t s , the marginal product 
of labour will now exceed the real product 
wage. Prof i ts w i l l be increased by 
taking on addit ional employees. The 
bas ic mechanism a t work i s t h a t the 
reduction in the rea l wage increases the 
firms "willingness to supply" i t s product 
at the price dictated by the market. 
However (given neoclassical production 
conditions) the marginal product of labour 
declines as the labour input i s increased 
- the neoclassical firm operates under 
cond i t i ons of d iminish ing marginal 
re turns . Consequently, the gap between 
the marginal product of labour and the 
rea l wage i s closed at some higher level 
of employment. The increased willingness 
to supply i s associated with a reduction 
in product price. 
Under present assumptions, then, there i s 
no doubt about the efficacy of a reduction 
in t he r e a l wage in s t i m u l a t i n g 
employment. Indeed, these assumptions 
are such as to ensure tha t the demand for 
labour depends solely upon the rea l wage 
and the level of the capi ta l stock. If 
addit ional inputs (eg raw mater ia ls , 
fuels) are allowed a separate influence in 
production, the demand for labour also 
becomes dependent on the real product 
p r i c e s of t he se o ther i n p u t s . In 
general, at least in a neoclassical world, 
the existence of other inputs permits the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of labour for them in 
response to a reduction in the rea l wage. 
Similar ly, if, on a longer time scale, 
capital i s included as a variable factor, 
the real product price of capi ta l would, 
in effect , replace the capi ta l stock as a 
determinant of labour demand, indicating 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of c a p i t a l labour 
substitution. This "substitution effect" 
i s c l e a r l y a s soc i a t ed wi th fu r t he r 
increases in prof i t s since i t involves 
more intensive use of the now cheaper 
f a c t o r . The e f f ec t i s , of course , 
additional to the stimulus to willingness 
t o s u p p l y , and so enhances t h e 
effectiveness of real wage reductions as a 
means of stimulating employment. 
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In the Keynesian vision, the firm i s 
typical ly not a price taker, and even 
where price-taking i s considered as a 
p o s s i b i l i t y , the prevai l ing price i s 
generally above that which "clears" (ie 
equates demand and supply in) the market. 
The c r i t i c a l point i s tha t Keynesians 
genera l ly view f i rms as "demand-
constrained" in the sense that they cannot 
s e l l a l l t h a t they would wish to a t 
prevailing pr ices . The key factor in 
this approach is not then limits on firms' 
"will ingess to supply", but l i m i t s on 
the i r "abi l i ty to se l l " the i r product in 
the assumed circumstances. 
In t h i s con tex t , what e f f ec t does a 
reduction in the real product wage have 
(maintaining the assumptions that labour 
and capi ta l are the only two inputs and 
that the la t ter i s fixed)? The impact on 
willingness to supply here i s irrelevant, 
since firms are already constrained by 
effective demand for their product to sell 
less than they would wish. There would, 
therefore, be no incentive to employ more 
labour since the resu l tan t additional 
output could not be sold. The demand for 
labour becomes invariant with respect to 
the rea l wage (eg Barro and Grossman; 
1971). Note tha t , for the moment, we 
ignore possible feedback effects through 
the e f f ec t of reduced r e a l wages on 
effective demand and indeed a l l other 
sources of interdependence in the 
macroeconomic system as a whole. Firms 
simply employ the minimum number of 
workers required to satisfy the demand for 
the i r product - a demand over which they 
have no control. Firms' output then 
becomes the major determinant of the 
demand for labour, and indeed, on present 
a s s u m p t i o n s , i t becomes the only 
determinant other than the capital stock. 
Allowance for additional inputs (or for a 
variable capital input) may restore some 
real wage sens i t iv i ty of the demand for 
labour by again permitting subst i tu t ion 
effects . (Although, s t r i c t l y , i t i s not 
the r e a l product wage which becomes 
r e l evan t he re , but r e l a t i v e fac to r 
prices.) However, th i s does nothing to 
restore the relevance of the willingness 
to supply mechanism: as long as demand 
constraints are binding on firms, th i s 
mechanism i s r e n d e r e d c o m p l e t e l y 
inoperative. Many Keynesians would in 
fact take issue with the neoclassical 
assumptions of factor substitutability and 
diminishing returns, but we do not pursue 
th i s here since the central issue in the 
eyes of most Keynesians i s the relevance 
of demand constraints. 
In the simplest neoclassical model the 
only way to s t imulate employment i s by 
reducing the real wage. In the simplest 
Keynesian model the only way to stimulate 
employment is by increasing firms' output 
- achieved by s t imu la t i ng demand and 
thereby relaxing the constraints on firms' 
"ab i l i ty to se l l " . I t i s , of course, 
true that in more sophisticated Keynesian 
models a reduction in the real wage may, 
via s u b s t i t u t i o n e f f e c t s , s t i m u l a t e 
employment, but the scale of the response 
i s l ike ly to be small in absolute terms 
and certainly in comparison to the effects 
of r e lax ing demand cons t ra in t s . No 
matter how sophisticated the Keynesian 
theory, the key to full employment l ies in 
the management of aggregate effective 
demand. 
The neoclassical/Monetarist theory of 
labour demand tends to foster the view 
that UK unemployment may be "classical" in 
nature ref lect ing excessive real wages, 
whereas t he a l t e r n a t i v e approach 
encourages the view that i t i s "Keynesian" 
- ref lect ing a deficiency of aggregate 
demand. 
The discussion so far has oversimplified 
in a number of respects. For example, i t 
seems l ikely that the Keynesian versus 
C la s s i ca l dichotomy i s excess ive ly 
s t y l i s e d . Thus, Layard and Nickell 
(1985) have developed an imperfec t ly 
competitive model which exhibits features 
of both n e o c l a s s i c a l and Keynesian 
approaches, and many par t ic ipants in the 
debate are of the view that the crucial 
issue is the empirical significance of the 
r e a l wage e f fec t ( r a t h e r than i t s 
ex i s t ence or the d i r e c t i o n of i t s 
influence). Furthermore, we have treated 
labour as a variable factor, whereas in 
fact i t i s expensive for firms to adjust 
the i r stock of employees. (See, for 
example, the Labour Market sections of the 
l a s t two Commentaries for an in tu i t ive 
account.) This causes the future to 
become relevant to current employment 
decisions in that, given the costs of new 
hires and redundancies, firms take on 
employees in the expectation that they 
wi l l remain with the firm for some time. 
I t i s consequently expected real wages 
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a n d / o r e x p e c t e d o u t p u t over t h e 
a n t i c i p a t e d employment period which 
becomes r e l e v a n t to the employment 
decision. Similar ly, the past becomes 
r e l e v a n t to the employment dec i s ion 
through f i r m s ' i n h e r i t e d s tock of 
employees (which is costly to adjust). 
Whilst the analysis has been simplified, 
i t does draw attention to a crucial issue: 
the importance of e f f e c t i v e demand 
r e l a t i v e t o r e a l wages . Before 
proceeding to the empirical evidence on 
th i s , i t i s worth noting a select ion of 
the formidable problems facing those who 
conduct empirical inves t igat ions of t h i s 
kind. F i r s t , i t i s expectat ions of 
output and real wages which are important, 
yet these are not observable. Most of 
the studies below assume a very simple 
relation between actual and expected real 
wages, but i t i s extremely d i f f i cu l t to 
assess the accuracy of this assumption or 
the nature of the bias i t inevitably 
introduces. Secondly, because of the 
costs of adjusting the stock of employees, 
firms are unlikely to respond very rapidly 
to changes in the de t e rminan t s of 
employment. Furthermore, the dynamics of 
adjustment may be rather more complex than 
can be captured with existing limited data 
sets. Thirdly, a l l of the studies assume 
that the observed level of employment i s 
t h a t demanded by f i r m s . I f a l l 
observations are not in fact "on the 
demand curve", t h i s w i l l in t roduce 
unmeasurable biases in the estimates, but 
i s likely to reduce the apparent response 
to real wages. This l i s t of difficulties 
i s by no means exhaustive, but i t should 
suffice to make readers very cautious in 
t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p r e c i s e 
numerical estimates presented below. 
All the e a r l i e r r e l e v a n t econometr ic 
l i t e r a t u r e tended to be in the Keynesian 
tradition, emphasising the role of output 
rather than relative prices in employment 
determination. For example, the 1984 
version of the Treasury model contained no 
role for wages: employment was determined 
by current output, numerous lagged values 
of output and a time trend. A number of 
recent s tudies based predominantly on 
output have, however, a l s o found a 
significant role for wages. The measured 
responsiveness of employment to real wages 
has tended generally to be fa i r ly low, 
with a long run real wage e l a s t i c i t y of 
between -0.2 and -0 .3 . (See eg Nickell 
(1981) and Owen (1985)) This means that 
a one percent reduction in the rea l wage 
would eventually stimulate employment by 
between 0.2 and 0.3 percent. However, 
both the LBS and Liverpool models exhibit 
rather greater responsiveness to real wage 
changes ( w i t h l o n g - r u n r e a l wage 
e l a s t i c i t i e s of around -0 .5 ) . (See 
Wallis et al (1984) Chapter 4.) 
Neoclassical models of labour demand have 
only appeared re la t ive ly recently in the 
econometr ic l i t e r a t u r e , and perhaps 
unsurprisingly have generated considerably 
higher est imates of long-run rea l wage 
e l a s t i c i t i e s of up to -1.65 in one case. 
(Symons, (1982), but see also Andrews 
(1983), Nickell and Andrews (1983) and 
Beens tock and Warbur ton (1984) ) . 
Comparisons among studies have to be 
undertaken with care in view of the facts 
that eg: some estimates refer only to the 
manufacturing sector whereas others are 
more aggregated; some s t u d i e s a re 
conducted on quarterly and others on 
annual data. 
Direct t e s t s of competing specifications 
are as yet ra re and so far inconclusive. 
Thus Symons and Layard (1984) found no 
role for effective demand in a study of 
the performance of a neoclassical demand 
function for six major countries including 
the UK, whereas Layard and Nickell (1985) 
find that i t has a very significant impact 
in the UK using a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t 
specification of the employment function. 
A r e c e n t s t u d y u s i n g S c o t t i s h 
manufacturing sector data found that the 
performance of individual real wage and 
demand v a r i a b l e s and the ranking of 
Keynesian and Neoclassical models was very 
sensitive to the precise specification of 
the employment equation and to the chosen 
observation period (Holden and McGregor 
(1985)). 
The recent evidence suggests that i t i s 
likely that there i s some inverse relation 
between the real wage and employment, but 
l i t t l e can yet be claimed about the 
strength or robustness of t h i s re la t ion . 
C e r t a i n l y , the evidence from s i n g l e 
e q u a t i o n s does not come c l o s e t o 
const i tu t ing a refutat ion of the notion 
tha t effective demand exerts a powerful 
influence on the level of employment. 
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A SYSTEM-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 
The preceding discussion leads to the 
notion that rea l wages matter, but not 
only real wages matter. Even the limited 
support that t h i s apparently offers for 
the notion tha t workers can and should 
" p r i c e t h e m s e l v e s i n t o j o b s " i s 
questionable, for (in the absence of 
indexation) workers bargain d i rec t ly for 
nominal or money wages, although actual 
and expected price changes will naturally 
exert a major influence on the level of 
money wage claims. The real product 
wage, however, is the money wage deflated 
by the price of firms' output, over which 
workers have no c o n t r o l . General 
reductions in money wages may generate 
general reductions in prices, too, so that 
i t i s not c lear how or i f workers can 
price themselves into jobs. Furthermore, 
from a macroeconomic perspective output 
cannot be t r e a t e d as exogenous ( i e 
outwith the influence of the subjects of 
the study), and i s l ikely to be affected 
by wage changes even in a Keynesian model. 
(Recall t h a t the neoc las s i ca l firms* 
output i s influenced directly by the real 
wage - i t i s chosen jointly with the level 
of employment.) 
In the Treasury experiment, i t i s the 
nominal wage variable which i s removed 
along with the equation in which i t i s 
explained. In cer tain circumstances, 
this equation can be re-interpreted as the 
supply equation in the labour market. 
Nominal wages are then set at such a level 
as to ensure that real wages are lowered 
by 2% over t h e i r 'base run* va lues . 
Differences between employment levels in 
the base run and 'shocked' run are then 
computed to determine the effect of a 2% 
shock to real wages. 
Figure 1 faci l i tates interpretation of the 
Treasury 's (and o t h e r s ' ) s imula t ions 
relating to wage reductions. The figure 
shows positively sloped aggregate supply 
and negatively sloped aggregate demand 
curves. The former show the relat ionship 
between the pr ice level (p) and the level 
of output (y) which firms wish to supply. 
The la t ter depict the relation between the 
price level and aggregate demand. I t i s 
assumed that prevailing conditions imply 
that ADp and ASo a r e relevant, in i t ia l ly , 
and that the economy i s in equilibrium at 
point A. 
Price level 
At the macro-economic level , real wages 
and employment depend on each other as 
wel l as on a vas t a r ray of other 
influences. Changes in these influences 
wil l affect both employment and real 
wages. Some wi l l cause employment and 
real wages to move in the same direction: 
others will cause them to move in opposite 
d i rec t ions . For example, a r i s e in 
aggregate demand will put upward pressure 
on both real wages and employment, whereas 
an increase in labour supply will increase 
employment but reduce real wages. 
Given that real wages and employment are 
both determined by the economic system, i t 
may not be immediately apparent how HMT 
was able to detect a negative trade-off 
between real wages and employment using 
their model of the UK economy. The trick 
in generating such a trade-off l ies with a 
s p e c i f i c t e c h n i q u e of econometric 
modelling, namely 'exogenisation'. This 
means that one equation and one variable 
are dropped from the model and the reduced 
system is then solved, using imposed 
values for the variable which i s no longer 
solved by the model. 
Real Income 
The negative slope of the aggregate demand 
curve r e f l e c t s a number of f a c t o r s . 
F i r s t , as the price level f a l l s , the real 
value of a given money stock increases, 
(provided the au thor i t ies adopt a policy 
of controlling the stock of nominal money 
balances) and th i s st imulates aggregate 
demand. Secondly, any wealth effect on 
consumption demand acts so as to increase 
consumption demand directly. Thirdly, in 
an open economy, a reduction in domestic 
78 
prices tends to s t imulate the net demand 
for exports (although t h i s depends to a 
degree on the exchange r a t e regime) . 
Finally, if the authorities' fiscal policy 
stance i s defined in terms of a ta rge t 
r a t i o of the public sector borrowing 
requirement to output, then any increase 
in output following a price decrease i s 
reinforced by permitting further tax cuts. 
The f i r s t and l a s t factors re f lec t a 
pol icy of main ta in ing an "unchanged 
nominal framework" which i s t o be 
contrasted with the a l t e rna t ive policy 
stance of "maintaining (interest and tax) 
rates". 
The aggregate supply curve, AS0> reflects 
production and labour market conditions. 
Drawn for a particular level of the money 
wage for the present, i t s posi t ive slope 
reflects the fact that as p increases, the 
r e a l product wage d e c l i n e s and so 
s t i m u l a t e s the assumed r e a l wage -
responsive demand for labour, and thus 
employment and output. 
A simplified var iant of the Treasury's 
analysis of a cut in the money wage goes 
as follows. First , through i t s effect on 
wil l ingness to supply at any given price 
level the AS curve moves to the r ight , to 
A S 1 , say. The size of the shi f t w i l l 
be g r e a t e r the higher the r e a l wage 
sens i t iv i ty of the demand for labour -
which the Treasury b e l i e v e s to be 
significant. 
The reduction in money wages sh i f t s the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of income in favour of 
p ro f i t s , and in the short-term th i s i s 
l ikely to reduce AD for a l l p as the 
propensity to spend out of prof i t s i s 
lower over t h i s time in te rva l than that 
out of household income. However, HMT do 
not b e l i e v e t h i s t o be of g r e a t 
quantitative significance and in any case 
the effect i s considered to be transitory, 
for companies rap id ly increase the i r 
expenditure out of their increased income 
to at l e a s t compensate for the reduced 
consumption expenditure. For simplicity, 
we can consider AD to remain a t ADQ o n 
this view. 
The resul tant excess supply of AE a t the 
in i t ia l price level causes prices to fal l 
in the Treasury model. The economy then 
moves from A to B, experiencing both a 
f a l l in pr ices and an increase in output. 
Fur thermore , the advantageous output 
effect wi l l be greater , the greater the 
price-sensitivity of aggregate demand (ie 
the " f l a t t e r " the AD curve). Given a 
judgement tha t money i s important in 
influencing real demand, that wealth 
effects are s igni f icant , tha t trade i s 
sens i t ive to r e l a t ive prices and given 
adherence to a p a r t i c u l a r "nominal 
framework" (the Medium Term Financial 
Strategy), the output effect seems likely 
a priori to be quite high. 
Treasury optimism on the case for wage 
cuts would be challenged on a number of 
points by Keynesian c r i t i c s . F i r s t , as 
we have seen, they a re r a t h e r l e s s 
sanguine about the l ike ly responsiveness 
of the demand for labour to rea l wage 
changes. In the extreme case , the 
increased wil l ingness to supply has no 
effect: prices do not respond to pressure 
from excess supply of AE and so the 
economy would remain at A. 
Second, most Keynesians would anticipate a 
l a s t i n g reduc t ion in AD given the 
red i s t r ibu t ion of income from wages to 
p ro f i t s . For example, if the curve 
s h i f t e d t o AD1I a n d P r i c e s were 
in f lex ib le , output would consequently 
contract by AF. 
Many on both s ides would accept tha t the 
end r e s u l t depends on the var ious 
conflicting forces. If AS shifts to the 
r ight , AD to the l e f t and prices are 
(ul t imately) f lexib le , then prices wi l l 
fa l l , but output may fal l , rise or remain 
unchanged (as in Figure 1). However, in 
genera l Keynesians expect a g r e a t e r 
l e f tward s h i f t in AD and a l e s s e r 
rightward shift in AS. Furthermore, they 
would maintain that even with f lexible 
prices any given rightward shi f t in AS 
would have l e s s favourable effects than 
others suppose. For Keynesians generally 
deny a uniquely powerful role to money and 
advocate the alternative policy stance of 
"maintaining ra tes" , and so ant ic ipa te 
that the AD curve i s l ike ly to be rather 
s t eep (and c e r t a i n l y would be in an 
"appropriate" policy regime of unchanged 
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" r a t e s " ) . The po l i cy of ma in ta in ing 
r a t e s i s favoured by Keynesians a t l e a s t 
in the presence of excess capacity, since 
i t minimises the amount of "crowding out" 
tha t can a r i s e (at output l eve l s l e s s than 
"full employment"). 
The s imple d iagrammat ic a n a l y s i s cannot 
hope to capture the fu l l complexity of the 
various views, or indeed of the Treasury's 
simulation. For example, some Keynesians 
(and c e r t a i n l y Keynes h imse l f ) held t h a t 
gene ra l wage c u t t i n g could lead t o an 
unstable general wage and pr ice def la t ion, 
a l though in an i n f l a t i o n a r y environment 
such f e a r s may be r a t h e r l e s s w e l l 
grounded than p r ev ious ly . On the o t h e r 
hand , many n e o c l a s s i c i s t s (and indeed 
o t h e r s ) would wish to e l a b o r a t e on the 
nature of the assumed i n i t i a l equilibrium 
a t A in F igure 1. Many would c la im t h a t 
t h e adverse e x t e r n a l shocks imposed by 
OPEC in the 1970s created leftward sh i f t s 
i n t h e AS c u r v e and n e c e s s i t a t e d a 
m o d e r a t i o n of l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s i f 
employment was to be maintained. Against 
t h i s b a c k g r o u n d , wage " c u t s " a r e 
interpreted as a sharing of the burden of 
adjustment in the domestic economy. 
Evidence of the effect of wage cuts in the 
c o n t e x t of t h e s y s t e m a s a whole i s 
p r e s e n t l y f a i r l y l i m i t e d , a l though the 
paper by Andrews e t a l (1985) r e p o r t s 
simulations for a l l ESRC financed models. 
F i r s t , t h e r e i s t h e p r o b l e m t h a t 
" f u n d a m e n t a l i s t " K e y n e s i a n s a r e n o t 
r ep re sen t ed in t h i s group of models, and 
indeed t h e v i e w s of some " e x t r e m e " 
K e y n e s i a n s a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
macroeconometric modelling. This i s not 
n e c e s s a r i l y an adverse comment on t he se 
views and i t c e r t a i n l y i s the case eg 
tha t the process of "exogenisation" of the 
money wage which i s a t the roo t of the 
s i m u l a t i o n s we r e p o r t , d e n i e s by 
a s s u m p t i o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
dynamically unstable deflat ion of the sor t 
we r e f e r r e d t o a b o v e . No 
macroeconometric model can hope to capture 
the exact views of any of the par t ic ipan ts 
in the debate, however. 
The p rocess of "exogenisa t ion" i t s e l f 
cons t i tu tes a second major problem. For 
i t i s not c l e a r what the source of the 
exogenous change in wages i s supposed t o 
be (a l though a r e f e r en c e i s made by HMT 
p l 8 t o the e f f e c t s of i nc reased market 
e f f i c i e n c y in the con tex t of p rev ious ly 
excessive r ea l wages). The r e s u l t s of the 
Treasury's s imulat ion, for example, could 
be i n t e r p r e t e d a s o f f e r i n g suppor t for a 
wages policy - yet t h i s i s anathema to the 
present Government. The exercise, in the 
a b s e n c e of a mechanism which can be 
implemented in p r a c t i c e , i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
one of wishfu l t h i n k i n g (Andrews e t a l 
1985). 
Th i rd ly , i t w i l l be app rec i a t ed t h a t 
underlying the AD and AS curves of Figure 
1 i s an e n t i r e s t r u c t u r a l model of the UK 
economy, each component of wh ich i s 
s u b j e c t t o s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
econometric ana lys i s t o those i d e n t i f i e d 
i n our d i s c u s s i o n of l a b o u r demand. 
S o p h i s t i c a t e d and i n s t r u c t i v e a s they 
undoubtedly are , current macroeconometric 
models of the UK economy should be handled 
(and i n t e r p r e t e d ) wi th extreme c a u t i o n . 
The T r e a s u r y ' s own s i m u l a t i o n s were 
conducted w i th a new ver s ion of t h e i r 
model in which t h e demand for l abour in 
the (non) manufacturing sector exhibi ts an 
e l a s t i c i t y of (-0.1) -0.25 with respect to 
t h e r e a l wage. Money wages were s e t so 
as t o ensure tha t t h i s r ea l wage was held 
2.0% below i t s a c t u a l l e v e l over t h e 
simulation period. 
The s i m u l a t i o n i m p l i e d t h a t f o r an 
unchanged nominal framework, employment 
would e v e n t u a l l y be 1.4J h igher as a 
consequence. Since t h i s response i s 
grea ter than would have been expected from 
t h e r e a l wage e l a s t i c i t y even of the 
demand for labour in manufacturing, i t i s 
c lear tha t , in t h i s case a t l e a s t , system-
wide responses enhance the response t o 
wage cuts . 
The genera l r e s u l t s d i sp layed a p a t t e r n 
s i m i l a r t o the Treasury view d iscussed 
above . Even in t h e f i r s t y e a r t h e 
i n i t i a l f a l l in consumption (moderated by 
the wealth effect induced by lower prices) 
was e n t i r e l y o f f s e t by higher company 
e x p e n d i t u r e s , and t h e s t imu lus t o net 
e x p o r t s r e s u l t e d in some i n c r e a s e in 
output. This s l igh t ly favourable impact 
e f f e c t i s enhanced by the subsequent 
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effects of reduced prices on consumption, 
and the induced reductions in tax rates as 
output r i s e s . While the price level 
f e l l , there was no sustained impact on 
inflation. 
When the policy stance was taken to be 
unchanged i n t e r e s t and tax r a t e s , the 
favourable effect on employment was rather 
less (1% for a 2% real wage cut), for the 
reasons given above. However, i t should 
be noted that this i s simply the converse 
of the fact that "unchanged ra tes" does 
not "punish" wage increases (by output and 
employment contraction) in the way that an 
"unchanged nominal framework" does. 
There are a number of problems with the 
Treasury's simulations. The real wage 
e l a s t i c i t y of labour demand for the non-
manufacturing sector was in fact imposed 
by the Treasury at a level higher than 
that freely estimated, and in order to 
generate the 2% real wage cut the nominal 
wage had to be made to f luctuate rather 
wi ld ly (Andrews e t al (1985b). The 
former point implies that the Treasury (in 
effect) caused a rather more favourable 
rightward sh i f t in the AS curve than was 
str ict ly merited by their freely estimated 
model. The l a t t e r point casts doubt on 
the poss ib i l i ty of workers (for whatever 
reason) mimicking the Treasury r e su l t s , 
and re f l ec t s the general concern over 
control of money wages. 
F i n a l l y , the Treasury r e p o r t s t h a t 
simulations with prices held at the i r 
in i t ia l level implied virtually no output 
effect (HMT, para 3.29). This might be 
considered unsurprising in the l i gh t of 
Figure 1, but i t does seem to make the 
point forcefully that the advantageous 
effects of the change are not d i rec t ly 
attributable to the fal l in the real wage, 
but to the general wage-price deflation 
which i s the mechanism by which i t i s 
achieved. This result (abstracting from 
the role of wealth effects and open-
economy influences) i s surprisingly close 
to Keynes' analysis of five decades ago, 
on the b a s i s of which he advocated 
stimulating demand more directly by fiscal 
expansion, rather than indi rec t ly (and 
dangerously in view of the possibility of 
cumulative deflation) - if at a l l - by 
means of wage reductions. Such a policy 
may confl ict with the Government of the 
days's target for in f la t ion , but the real 
wage i s not the c r i t i c a l issue here (see 
eg Hopkin (1984)). 
Andrews et al (1985) report the results of 
simulating wage reductions in five major 
macroeconometric models of the UK economy. 
The r e su l t s generally imply employment 
effects of lower magnitude than those 
found by the Treasury, but they do employ 
the then publicly available Treasury model 
which had no rea l wage in the employment 
function and no inbuilt adjustment of tax 
rates to maintain the ratio of the public 
sector borrowing requirement to output. 
All the models did, however, imply that 
employment could be stimulated by wage 
reductions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Recent evidence from studies of the demand 
for labour suggests the existence of an 
inverse re la t ion between employment and 
the r e a l wage, but t he r e remains 
considerable doubt concerning the strength 
of t h i s e f f ec t . Furthermore, t h i s 
evidence certainly does not permit denial 
of the ro l e of e f f e c t i v e demand in 
determining employment: real wages may 
matter, but they are certainly not a l l 
that matters. 
The evidence of real wage sens i t iv i ty of 
employment does not in any case seem to 
relate directly to the notion that workers 
can and should "price themselves into jobs", for workers bargain in terms of 
money wages. S imu l t a t i ons of wage 
r e d u c t i o n s u s i n g t h e m a j o r 
macroeconometric models i n d i c a t e a 
p o s i t i v e e f f e c t , but of a genera l ly 
smaller magnitude, than that found by the 
Treasury. There are grounds for 
believing that the Treasury a n a l y s i s 
e x a g g e r a t e s t h e e f f e c t s of wage 
reductions, and for worrying about how 
these might be effected in the required 
manner (or indeed at all) . Furthermore, 
such beneficial effects as do occur from 
the postulated reductions in money wages 
are attributable primarily to the effects 
of genera l wage-pr ice d e f l a t i o n in 
stimulating aggregate demand, and not to 
the real wage reduction per se. 
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